Former Tribunal Psychologist’s Concerns

Magnify the Light, Psychologist’s Concerns are Founded in Law

A psychologist who used to work for a Catholic diocese annulment tribunal just answered a written interview on Leila Miller’s blog. “Tribunal psychologist: ‘I could conceivably make a case for any marriage being null’.” The diocese was unidentified, and the psychologist described concerns about their practices. At the beginning, it was made clear that the psychologist’s “intent is to shine light on issues that require further consideration in the tribunal process.” The psychologist concludes, “the nullity process, as it currently stands, is a bad response to the sin of divorce.”

I’m asking Leila to forward my observations to the psychologist. Using canon law, I magnify the light and show how the psychologist’s concerns are well founded.

To: Psychologist

Maturity, Knowledge about the other Spouse

You said the most used reason for nullity was canon 1095 §2 “lack of due discretion.” However, the definition you relayed to readers, that I imagine you were taught by tribunal judges, is deficient:

The tribunal judge asked you questions “regarding the credibility of the petitioner, as well as whether or not the petitioner seemed to have knowledge of certain things before the marriage took place.”

Immaturity: If the Tribunal judges taught you that immaturity, in a general way, makes a marriage invalid, that is untrue.  Saint Pope John Paul II criticized the overuse of immaturity in his 1987 speech to the Roman Rota. He criticized the “the scandal of seeing the value of Christian marriage being practically destroyed by the exaggerated and almost automatic multiplication of declarations of nullity of marriage in cases of the failure of marriage on the pretext of some immaturity or psychic weakness on the part of the contracting parties.”

In 2006, the Dean of the world’s appeal tribunal at the Roman Rota, described the laxism in the application of the law:

Psychopathology: The fact that you only said you were questioned about the petitioner implies that only the petitioner was alleged to be the cause of the invalidity. The petitioners should have been informed that canon 1095 §2 is only applicable for those who suffered a serious psychic anomaly (see JPII 1987) or suffered severe forms of psychopathology (JPII 1988).  If the judges were upholding the law, they would have required petitioners start the case with a petition that identified the grounds alleged against their marraige and described the facts and proofs, in a general way, supporting those grounds (D.C. 116 §1, 2°-3°, can. 1504, 2°). Did you see petitions in which the petitioners alleged they were suffering from mental illness or severe psychopathologies? If not, the judge should have rejected the petitions and  told the petitioner to rewrite their petition to show some general facts supporting their alleged grounds. See excerpts from Roman Rota judge, Msg. Cormac Burke on requirements for petition (a.k.a. libellus). If the grounds was 1095 §2, the petition should show some serious psychic anomaly or severe forms of psychopathology.

If the petitioner is the one alleged to be the cause of invalidity, the characteristics of the other spouse are irrelevant to canon 1095 §2. All that matters is the incapacitated person’s ability to conceptualize the essential canonical obligations of marriage and whether his will was functioning enough to choose them. The object of canon 1095 §2 is not the other spouse; it is marriage itself: “grave lack of discretionary judgement concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted” (c. 1095 §2).

It appears from your interview with Leila Miller that the judges were not in the practice of asking psychologists the questions that the law requires:

Prior to the judge deciding a marriage was invalid, did they have reports from you — using the scientific method — describing the particular serious psychic anomaly or severe forms of psychopathology found in the party causing invalidity? If not, then no annulment should have been granted. Note, that every nullity case is supposed to have a Defender of the Bond. He is obligated to “observe whether the expert opinions are rooted in a Christian anthropology and have been drawn up according to a scientific method” (D.C. art. 56 §1).

Leading Questions:

You expressed concern about leading questions. This is illegal. Canon 1564 says that the questions are to be brief and “are not to be leading questions.”

Goal:  Grant Annulment

You wrote “Another red flag for me was the sense I got that the goal of the process was to grant the annulment.” You are right.  Fr. Jaimes Ponce, wrote his doctoral dissertation on “Lack of Internal Freedom on Matrimonial Consent.” He interviewed one priest who was fired from his job at the tribunal by his own bishop because the priest refused to promise to give annulments to at least 95% of the petitioners.

Present During Juridical Examination of Parties

You told Leila that you were present for the recorded interview of the petitioners. The judge should not have had you in the room when he took testimony from parties. Nothing in law allows an expert to be present (D.C. art 166, can. 1561).  A tribunal psychologist is one of the persons that should undergo questioning by the judge, not one of the persons present at the questioning of a party (D.C. art. 162 §1 “The parties, the witnesses, and as the case may be, the experts are to be examined”). During your juridic exam, you give expert testimony to the judge. The Defender of the Bond and the advocates for both parties could be present. Besides being invited to study proofs already collected in the case, you are given “aids which he could need in order to carry out his task properly and faithfully” (D.C. art. 207 §2, can. 1577 §2). Those aids could be a one-on-one interview with the party alleged to be the cause of invalidity.

Job Title and Role

You told Leila that your primary role was  a “psychological assessor.” It is inappropriate for a tribunal judge to make his expert psychological witness also an assessor.  In cases challenging the nullity of a marriage, the job title of a psychologist is not assessor; it is “expert” (D.C. art. 203-213). By default, annulment cases are supposed to be judged by a three-judge panel, called a college (D.C. art. 30 §1, Mitus Iudex can. 1673 §§3-4). Only if it is impossible for a diocese to have three judges, are they allowed to have the cases decided by a single judge with the assistance of two assessors.  An assessor is assumed as a consultant to a single judge (D.C. art. 52, 30 §3, 1983 CIC c. 1424, Mitis Iudex c. 1673 §4).  One who takes part in a case as an assessor is not allowed to also be an expert (D.C. art. 66 §2, can. 1447). If the tribunal acted like a psychologist was an assessor – then the psychologist had the role of judging. If the tribunal followed the law, the psychologist should have the role of a witness who has specialized knowledge.

Bad Response to Sin of Divorce

You wrote “the nullity process, as it currently stands, is a bad response to the sin of divorce.”  The Church’s response to separation of spouses and divorce is not supposed to be annulment. It is supposed to be the implementation of the canon law on separation of spouses. Just as one is not competent to decide, on one’s own volition, that one has an invalid marriage and the right to enter another marriage, one is not competent to decide that one has the right to permanent separation of spouses and divorce.  Mary’s Advocates shows abandoned spouses how to ask for pastoral care correcting marital abandoners and pointing them to experts known for success at helping couples strengthen marriage.

Would you be willing to report your observations about the particular tribunal to the Supreme Tribunal of the Signatura?